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June 1, 2026

The Honorable Howard Lutnick
Secretary
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20230

Dear Secretary Lutnick:

This letter is to express concern regarding the recent decision by the Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) to authorize a foreign automaker with significant ties to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to continue importing, selling, and producing connected vehicles in the United States despite the administration's connected vehicle security restrictions.

The Department of Commerce finalized these rules because connected vehicle technologies present clear national security risks. Modern connected vehicles are capable of collecting and transmitting enormous amounts of sensitive information, including geolocation data, driving patterns, infrastructure mapping, operational diagnostics, and personal consumer information. These systems can enable remote access to vehicle functions. As the Department itself recognized, these technologies are vulnerable to exploitation by our adversaries and could be leveraged for surveillance, intelligence gathering, or disruption of critical infrastructure.

This authorization appears to create a pathway for entities with substantial ownership, operational, or governance ties to the PRC to continue accessing our market despite the intent of the underlying connected vehicle rule. Congress and multiple administrations have recognized that Chinese companies operate under laws that can compel cooperation with the PRC and their intelligence services. These concerns cannot be mitigated simply through corporate restructuring, branding distinctions, or supply chain adjustments.

The decision also raises broader concerns about whether existing authorization and waiver processes may inadvertently create loopholes that undermine the effectiveness of the rule. If entities tied to the PRC are permitted to continue operating in our market through exemptions or special authorizations, it risks weakening the very protections the rule was designed to establish.

These concerns extend beyond national security. China's automotive sector benefits from extensive state support, industrial overcapacity, unfair trade and labor practices, and distorted market conditions that threaten the long-term competitiveness of the American auto industry and our workers, suppliers, and communities that depend on it. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes that allowed critical manufacturing sectors to be hollowed out through unfair competition and foreign subsidization.

Congress has increasingly recognized the seriousness of these threats. Bipartisan, bicameral legislation that has been introduced would prohibit the importation, manufacture, and sale of connected vehicles, software, and hardware linked to foreign adversaries, including entities subject to the control or direction of the PRC. These proposals reflect growing bipartisan concern that current authorities may not be sufficient to fully address evolving national security and economic risks.

Accordingly, I request a briefing on the basis for this authorization decision and the broader implications for implementation and enforcement of the connected vehicle rule. Given the significant national security, economic, and supply chain concerns involved, I would welcome either a classified or unclassified briefing, in whichever setting the Department believes is most appropriate to provide a full understanding of the decision, the safeguards in place, and the potential implications for future authorizations. I also request answers to the following questions:

- What criteria did OICTS use to determine that this authorization would not pose a national security risk?

- What safeguards, mitigation measures, or ongoing compliance requirements were imposed as conditions of the authorization?

- How does the Department evaluate ownership structures, governance relationships, board representation, operational control, and technology development ties when assessing whether an entity is subject to the direction or jurisdiction of a foreign adversary of concern?

- How does the Department intend to prevent the authorization process from creating broader loopholes that may be used by additional foreign adversary-linked entities seeking entry into the U.S. market?

- What coordination occurred between the Department, the intelligence community, and other national security agencies prior to approving this authorization?

- Does the Department anticipate granting similar authorizations to additional entities tied to foreign adversaries of concern?

- How will the Department ensure that future connected vehicle restrictions are fully enforceable and not circumvented through corporate affiliations, joint ventures, licensing arrangements, or other indirect ownership structures?

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I look forward to your response and continued engagement on efforts to protect our national security, consumer privacy, and the future of the domestic auto industry.

Sincerely,

Debbie Dingell

Debbie Dingell
Member of Congress

CC: Mr. Jeffrey Kessler, Under Secretary, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS); Ms. Katelyn Christ, Executive Director, Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS)